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AbstrAct
Objectives From April 2015, NHS England (NHSE) started 
to devolve responsibility for commissioning primary care 
services to clinical commissioning groups (CCGs). The 
aim of this paper is to explore how CCGs are managing 
potential conflicts of interest associated with groups of GPs 
commissioning themselves or their practices to provide 
services.
Design We carried out two telephone surveys using a 
sample of CCGs. We also used a qualitative case study 
approach and collected data using interviews and meeting 
observations in four sites (CCGs).
setting/participants We conducted 57 telephone 
interviews and 42 face-to-face interviews with general 
practitioners (GPs) and CCG staff involved in primary care co-
commissioning and observed 74 meetings of CCG committees 
responsible for primary care co-commissioning.
results Conflicts of interest were seen as an inevitable 
consequence of CCGs commissioning primary care. Particular 
problems arose with obtaining unbiased clinical input for 
new incentive schemes and providing support to GP provider 
federations. Participants in meetings concerning primary care 
co-commissioning declared conflicts of interest at the outset 
of meetings. Different approaches were pursued regarding 
GPs involvement in subsequent discussions and decisions 
with inconsistency in the exclusion of GPs from meetings. CCG 
senior management felt confident that the new governance 
structures and policies dealt adequately with conflicts of 
interest, but we found these arrangements face limitations. 
While the revised NHSE statutory guidance on managing 
conflicts of interest (2016) was seen as an improvement on 
the original (2014), there still remained some confusion over 
various terms and concepts contained therein.
conclusions Devolving responsibility for primary care 
co-commissioning to CCGs created a structural conflict of 
interest. The NHSE statutory guidance should be refined 
and clarified so that CCGs can properly manage conflicts of 
interest. Non-clinician members of committees involved in 
commissioning primary care require training in order to make 
decisions requiring clinical input in the absence of GPs.
bAckgrOunD
A conflict of interest is a set of 
circumstances that creates a risk that an 
individual’s ability to apply judgement or 
act in one role is, or could be, impaired 
or influenced by a secondary interest.1 
The Health and Social Care Act 2012 substan-
tially reorganised the commissioning system in 
England, creating general practitioner (GP)-
led clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) with 
responsibility for commissioning the majority 
of secondary and community care services. 
Responsibility for commissioning primary care 
services was given to a new national body, NHS 
England (NHSE), partly to avoid the conflicts of 
interest associated with groups of GPs commis-
sioning themselves or their practices to provide 
services. From 1 April 2015, NHSE started 
devolving this responsibility to CCGs. This 
policy change was motivated by CCGs’ knowl-
edge of local population health needs and their 
assumed ability to commission integrated path-
ways. These benefits were seen as outweighing 
the risks of conflicts of interest.
In 2014/2015, prior to the transfer of 
responsibility for commissioning primary 
care services to CCGs, the National Audit 
Office (NAO) undertook an investigation 
into the management of conflicts of interests 
by CCGs in response to Parliamentary and 
public concerns. The investigation consisted 
of interviews with the Department of Health, 
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Research
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The first study investigating conflicts of interest 
for clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) 
commissioning primary care services.
 ► In-depth case studies of four CCGs nationally.
 ► We complemented four in-depth case studies with a 
national telephone survey.
 ► Analysis of all CCG primary care co-commissioning 
application documents.
 ► Telephone survey was a snapshot in time (twice), 
but we achieved a good response rate.
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NHSE and Monitor, document review, visits to two CCGs 
and the collection of information from all CCG websites. 
The resulting report was published in September 2015.2
The report highlighted the potential for conflicts of 
interest, in particular when GPs are likely to be providers 
of services commissioned by CCGs. The NAO expected 
the risk of conflicts of interest to increase with the 
introduction of primary care co-commissioning and 
raised concerns about the ability of NHSE to respond 
adequately to this increase. The NAO reviewed the poli-
cies and processes CCGs introduced during 2014/2015 
to meet legislative requirements to prevent and manage 
conflicts of interest. These included the appointment of 
lay members to the CCG governing body (GB), publica-
tion of GB meeting papers and minutes and online publi-
cation of registers of interest for GB members. Although 
a minority of CCGs reported they had to manage actual 
or perceived conflicts of interest during 2014/2015, it was 
not always evident from publicly available information 
how these conflicts of interests were managed by CCGs. 
The report also highlighted variation between CCGs in 
the perceived adequacy of controls for managing conflicts 
of interest.
This paper adds to the NAO report in a number of ways. 
Most importantly, our research commenced in 2015, after 
CCGs took on responsibility for commissioning primary 
care. This allowed us to observe the effectiveness of the 
processes and structures CCGs put in place to respond 
to the increased risk of conflicts of interest. Second, we 
collected rich and detailed primary data using a combi-
nation of an in-depth case study approach of four CCGs 
nationally and two telephone surveys of a sample of CCGs.
Agency theory and corporate governance
Agency theory provides a useful framework to under-
stand why conflicts of interest arise in the context of 
CCGs commissioning primary care. Jensen and Meckling3 
define an agency relationship as a contract whereby a prin-
cipal delegates specific activities to an agent to undertake 
on their behalf. The delegation of responsibilities will be 
unproblematic if the principal has full information or if 
the objectives of the principal correspond to those of the 
agent.4 However, if both the principal and the agent seek 
to maximise their own utility, then the interests of the 
agent are likely to diverge from those of the principal.3 
This leads to an agency problem, or conflict of interest.5 
The principal can limit the extent to which the agent acts 
in his own interest by creating appropriate incentives for 
the agent and by monitoring the activities of the agent.3
In the corporate world, company shareholders can 
be viewed as principals who delegate responsibility for 
managing the company to an agent—the board. Moni-
toring management activity is costly, and all shareholders 
can potentially benefit from monitoring activities carried 
out by only one shareholder. This leads to an incentive 
for shareholders to free ride on the activities of other share-
holder(s), and this in turn reduces the likelihood that 
any individual shareholder(s) will undertake monitoring 
activities.5 This lack of monitoring, allied with the separa-
tion between ownership and control, can lead to conflicts 
of interest if management pursue their own interests at 
the expense of shareholders.5–7
In the context of primary care co-commissioning, an 
analogy can be drawn between the board of directors and 
GPs. CCGs are agents acting on behalf of NHSE (the prin-
cipal), which carries statutory responsibility for spending 
public funds, acting as a proxy for taxpayers. In their 
primary care commissioning role, GPs assume a stew-
ardship function for those funds, from which they could 
potentially benefit financially, non-financially (personal 
or professional) or indirectly. In the absence of adequate 
monitoring by NHSE or a proxy, GPs have a potential 
conflict of interest if they pursue their own interests, 
which diverge from those of NHSE.
In business, corporate governance mechanisms act 
to align the interests of shareholders and management 
and limit undesirable behaviour on the part of manage-
ment.7 These governance structures include the prohibi-
tion of actions and decisions leading to self-dealing, the 
use of independent boards and chairs,8 9 an environment 
encouraging disclosure, which serves to overcome infor-
mation asymmetry between the principal and agent,10 
peer pressure and ethics training.11
Company shareholders elect a board of directors to act 
on their behalf. In the UK, the report of ‘The Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’12 
outlined a number of important recommendations for 
the composition of boards and associated committees 
including:
 ► The separation of the roles of chief executive and 
chairman of the board
 ► The majority of the board should comprise inde-
pendent or non-executive directors, selected by a 
formal process for a fixed term.
A key role of the board of directors is to monitor 
executive management and ensure that the company is 
run in the best interests of shareholders.5 6 8 9 13 Nolan8 
asserts that suitably skilled and motivated independent 
or non-executive directors are ideal for monitoring and 
controlling the potential conflicts of interest of executive 
directors as, unlike shareholders, non-executive directors 
have a continuous involvement in the governance of the 
company and do not face the problem of collective action 
due to the public good nature of shareholder monitoring. 
Lay members of CCG decision-making committees are 
akin to non-executive directors in that they provide an 
external view of the work of the CCG that is impartial 
and strategic, and they are removed from the day-to-day 
running of the organisation.14
Nevertheless, these corporate governance mechanisms 
are not without limitations. Boards of directors are often 
regarded as being too close to management and unable 
to apply proper scrutiny of decisions due to an inability 
to fully comprehend complex financial affairs.6 9 Hart5 
draws attention to the shortcomings of non-executive 
directors as effective monitors of executive directors. 
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Namely, the former may have little personal gain from 
improved company performance, have busy schedules 
and may have undue loyalty to managers who put them 
in these positions and pay their fees. Cafaggi13 asserts that 
there is a trade-off between the impartiality of non-exec-
utive directors and accountability, reflecting the tenuous 
link between the interests of independent directors and 
shareholders. Moreover, the independence of non-execu-
tive directors should be subject to monitoring and inter-
mittent inspection as it is not necessarily a static quality. 
There is an onus on non-executive board members to 
monitor each other, but this can present difficulties due 
to the relationships that arise among peers and the influ-
ential role of subordinate management, particularly in 
influencing relationships among independent directors.13
Simply disclosing a conflict of interest is viewed as inad-
equate without effective monitoring of management’s 
conduct and compliance8 13 ideally by independent, 
non-executive directors.8 Disclosure can aggravate the 
effects of conflicts of interest by generating bias.15 16 This 
is because the conflicted individual anticipates that their 
judgement will be discounted after disclosure, and they 
respond by strategically exaggerating their judgements in 
anticipation of this subsequent discounting. This implies 
that disclosure of a conflict of interest amplifies rather 
than alleviates bias.15 Moreover, there is evidence that 
recipients of biased advice do not discount it as much as 
they should following disclosure.16
nHsE statutory guidance on conflicts of interest for ccgs
In December 2014, NHSE published statutory guidance 
for CCGs on conflicts of interest, to take effect on 1 April 
2015 when CCGs could take on additional responsibility 
for primary care commissioning.17 This replaced guidance 
for CCGs on managing conflicts of interest published by 
NHSE in 2013. The new 2014 guidance recognised that 
by taking on responsibility for commissioning primary 
care, CCGs would expose themselves to a greater risk of 
both real and perceived conflicts of interest. This neces-
sitated a strengthening of the existing guidance. CCGs 
had to verify that they had plans in place to comply with 
the guidance when they applied to take on delegated or 
joint commissioning responsibilities, as well as during the 
annual CCG performance-assessment process.
NHSE updated the 2014 guidance in June 201618 
following a co-commissioning conflicts of interest audit 
in 2015/2016,19 the NAO report on the management of 
conflicts of interest in CCGs2 and feedback from a public 
consultation exercise. The revised guidance recognised 
that conflicts of interest are inevitable and need to be 
managed appropriately in order to assure the public, 
providers and Parliament of the fairness and robustness 
of CCG decisions and that they are transparent and offer 
value for money. The expressed purposes of the revised 
guidance included: supporting the understanding and 
management of conflicts of interest among commis-
sioners; enabling commissioners to act fairly and trans-
parently in the best interests of their patients and the 
local population; and maintaining public confidence in 
the NHS. More specifically, the document guided CCGs 
on:
 ► How to identify and manage conflicts of interest.
 ► Declarations of interests.
 ► The maintenance of registers of interests.
 ► Appointments and roles and responsibilities within 
the CCG.
 ► The management of conflicts of interest at meetings 
and throughout the commissioning cycle.
 ► The role of the internal audit.
 ► Procedure in the case of breaches of the guidance.
 ► The impact of non-compliance.
 ► Conflicts of interest training.
The revised guidance18 expanded on some areas 
addressed in the original guidance such as registers of 
interest, governance and decision-making processes and 
procurement. The key changes in the revised guidance 
were:
 ► The appointment of a minimum of three lay members 
to the CCG GB.
 ► The appointment a conflicts of interest guardian.
 ► The inclusion of a robust process for managing 
breaches of the conflicts of interest policy and publi-
cation of anonymised details of the breach on the 
CCG’s website.
 ► Strengthened provisions for decision making when a 
committee member has a conflict including:
 – Advising that the chair proactively consider 
potential conflicts of interest and how they 
should be managed prior to the meeting and take 
appropriate steps such as ensuring the conflicted 
member is not sent meeting papers related to the 
conflicted item;
 – Advising that the chair ask for declarations of 
interest at the beginning of a meeting and that 
committee members alert the chair to a potential 
conflict of interest that has not been declared;
 – Detailing the range of actions that could be taken 
by the Chair if a committee member has a conflict 
of interest;
 ► Strengthened provisions for the management of gifts 
and hospitality including prompt declarations and a 
register of gifts and hospitality that can be accessed 
by the public. Gifts and hospitality were not explicitly 
mentioned in the 2014 guidance.
 ► CCGs should undertake an annual audit of conflicts 
of interest management as part of the internal audit 
and include the audit findings in the annual end-of-
year governance statement.
 ► CCG employees, committee members and practice 
staff involved in CCG business must undertake manda-
tory online conflicts of interest training provided by 
NHSE.
The revised guidance18 made clear that in situations 
where an individual has a direct financial interest that 
can lead to a serious conflict, the CCG should consider 
whether this interest can be managed. If not, it may be 
group.bmj.com on January 13, 2018 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
4 Moran V, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e018422. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2017-018422
Open Access 
Table 1 Number of responses from level 3 (delegated responsibility) and level 2 (joint commissioning) telephone surveys
Levels Regions
Number of CCGs taking 
over responsibility from 
April 15 Sample CCGs
Total response 
from the first 
survey
Total response 
from the second 
survey
Delegated
(level 3)
North 24 7 7 2
Midlands & East 26 8 8 4
London 6 2 2 1
South 8 3 3 5
Total (level 3) 64 20 20 12
Joint
(level 2)
North 31 10 6 6
Midlands & East 16 6 3 1
London 20 3 1 0
South 20 7 7 1
Total (level 2) 87 26 17 8
CCGs, clinical commissioning groups.
appropriate to prevent the continuation of the circum-
stances that facilitated the conflict. This may mean 
the individual discontinuing their role in the CCG 
or preventing such an appointment in the first place. 
Moreover, an individual with an interest in an organisa-
tion that provides or is expected to provide substantial 
services to the CCG should not be a member of the CCGs’ 
GB or any committee or subcommittee, particularly if 
the conflict prevents them from effectively performing 
their role.
The 2016 guidance required CCGs to implement 
robust systems to identify and manage conflicts of interest 
to ensure that decision making is ‘transparent and fair’. 
The guidance advised CCGs that this could be achieved 
by keeping accurate records and involving the public in 
primary care commissioning committee (PCCC) meet-
ings. Provider engagement in service specification and 
procurement should also be ‘transparent’.
The revised guidance18 stipulated that register(s) of 
interest must include:
1. All CCG employees including full-time and part-time 
staff, including those on short-term contracts.
2. All members of the CCG’s committees and subcom-
mittees/subgroups.
3. All members of the CCG including GP partners and 
any person directly involved in decision making of the 
CCG.
Following our fieldwork, in February 2017, NHSE 
published further NHS-wide guidance, which came into 
force in June 2017 to complement the statutory guidance 
for CCGs.20 The revised guidance18 was slightly refined to 
ensure consistency with the NHS-wide guidance.21 This 
meant that CCGs were required to include only deci-
sion-making staff on the published register of interests.
Against this background, we undertook a study 
of primary care co-commissioning including CCGs’ 
approaches to managing conflicts of interest as they 
took on this additional responsibility. We explored how 
CCGs responded to this guidance and how the resulting 
processes played out in practice.
stuDy DEsign AnD mEtHODs
Overall research design
This research was undertaken as part of a wider study on 
primary care co-commissioning.22
We undertook an exploratory approach, combining 
analysis of policy documents, telephone surveys with a 
sample of CCGs and detailed case studies. During the 
first stage of our field work, the 2014 statutory guidance 
for CCGs on managing conflicts of interest17 was in place. 
The revised 2016 guidance18 came into effect while we 
were still undertaking field work. This allowed us to 
observe how the new guidance was responded to during 
meetings and to explore it with our interviewees.
review of ccg application documents
In order to explore the uptake of primary care co-com-
missioning nationally (April–May 2015), we obtained 
from NHSE (with CCGs’ agreement) 147 applications 
from 150 CCGs (some CCGs had submitted a joint appli-
cation with their neighbouring CCGs). We reviewed these 
applications and created a database of CCGs, listing their 
levels of co-commissioning responsibility, contact details 
of a named person responsible within each CCG and 
detailed information on what was stated or included in 
their application.
telephone surveys
From the database, described above, we selected a sample 
of CCGs based on various criteria to target for two tele-
phone surveys. The first telephone survey was conducted 
at 1 year following the policy announcement (June–
August 2015). Our sampling criteria included: level of 
co-commissioning responsibility, regional area the CCG 
belonged to, size of CCG, urban versus rural CCG and 
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Table 2 Details of case study sites
Case study site Location of CCG Level No. of interviews No. of meetings attended
Site 1 North Delegated 7 13
Site 2 Midlands & East Delegated 13 24
Site 3 South Delegated 11 6
Site 4 North Initially joint and moved to 
delegated
11 31
Total 42 74 (approximately 111 hours of 
observations)
CCGs, clinical commissioning groups.
those undertaking collaborative commissioning with 
a neighbouring CCG(s) or having submitted a joint 
application. We repeated the survey at 2 years following 
the policy announcement (August–October 2016) and 
contacted the same sample of CCGs. Between the first 
and second surveys, we found that a number of people 
had left the organisation or changed job roles, which 
meant that recruitment was more problematic for the 
second round. Moreover, some of the CCGs we spoke 
with changed their levels of responsibilities from greater 
involvement to joint or delegated or from joint to dele-
gated. Table 1 provides an overview of the telephone 
survey sample and response rates. The telephone inter-
views were conducted at the University of Manchester 
and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. 
The telephone interviews were audio recorded and were 
less than 1 hour in duration. Results from both phases of 
the survey were tabulated into a database for analysis. In 
this paper, we concentrate on the responses from CCGs 
that opted for level 3 (delegated responsibility) and level 
2 (joint commissioning) as they were more likely to face 
conflicts of interest issues than level 1 (greater involve-
ment) CCGs, who would have ‘influence’ but not take the 
lead in shaping primary care locally.22
case studies
We conducted qualitative case studies in four CCGs nation-
ally. The selection of the case study sites was informed by 
the findings of the first telephone survey. Table 2 details 
the case study sites and data collected in each site. Once 
access to sites had been agreed, we had some difficulty in 
accessing a full range of meetings, with some sites reluc-
tant to allow us to attend non-public meetings. Concerns 
included issues of confidentiality and concerns about the 
sharing of commercially sensitive information. However, 
in all sites, these concerns were eventually overcome, 
allowing us access to a full range of relevant types of 
meetings.
Our observations focused mainly on meetings associ-
ated with primary care co-commissioning, which included 
the PCCC and its subcommittees or subgroups. These 
varied in composition and designation, with descriptors 
including strategy committee, operational committee 
and quality committee. However, these names were not 
related to functions in any standard way, with no clearly 
discernible differences between a subgroup labelled 
‘strategy’ and one labelled ‘operational’. We attended a 
total of 74 meetings (approximately 111 hours of obser-
vations). Field notes were made during and after the 
meeting observations.
We conducted 42 face-to-face interviews across the four 
sites with members of the PCCC such as the lay chair, 
primary care manager, head of contracts, head of quality, 
head of estates, head of engagement, local medical 
council (LMC) representative and director of Health-
watch. We also interviewed the CCGs’ GB chair, account-
able officer and chief finance officer. These interviewees 
were purposively selected based on their knowledge of 
and involvement in primary care co-commissioning. No 
interviewee that we approached refused to participate.
Experienced qualitative researchers (VM, IM, LW-G, 
OG and DB) conducted the interviews and meeting 
observations. The researchers had no relationship with 
the research participants other than that related to the 
research. Participants were approached by email or tele-
phone in the first instance, were given written documen-
tation describing the aims of this research and given an 
opportunity to ask questions prior to giving their consent 
to participate. The face-to-face interviews and meeting 
observations were generally held in the CCGs’ offices, 
with only the interviewer and interviewee present. The 
face-to-face interviews lasted approximately 1 hour and 
were audio recorded and transcribed. No repeat face-to-
face interviews were conducted as all the necessary infor-
mation was collected.
For data analysis, an initial coding framework was devel-
oped from our reading of relevant policy documents 
and our prior understanding of relevant literature. This 
was supplemented by the inductive coding of additional 
themes arising from the analysis, with six authors (VM, 
IM, KC, LW-G, DB and AC) involved in discussing and 
agreeing these codes. Major themes included in the final 
coding framework were conflicts of interest, governance 
and structures, internal and external relationships, main 
areas of activity and service and problems encountered 
since taking on co-commissioning responsibility. The 
coding framework was used to code the interviews and 
meeting observations by five of the authors (VM, IM, 
LW-G, OG and DB) using the NVivo software.
group.bmj.com on January 13, 2018 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
6 Moran V, et al. BMJ Open 2017;7:e018422. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2017-018422
Open Access 
rEsults
Following the structure of the NAO report, we discuss 
our results in terms of the accountability, control and 
assurance arrangements in place to prevent and manage 
conflicts of interest, the risks of conflicts of interest and 
the management of conflicts of interest in practice.
Accountability, control and assurance arrangements
A number of interviewees and telephone survey respon-
dents shared their views on the NHSE statutory guidance 
on managing conflicts of interest for CCGs, particularly 
on the revision of the guidance published in 2016.
During the second telephone survey, five CCGs 
discussed the NHSE conflicts of interest guidance. Of 
these, two CCGs explicitly referred to the revised guid-
ance18 published prior to the second telephone survey, 
and we do not know whether the other three CCGs were 
also referring to the revised guidance. While some inter-
viewees raised the topic of the revised guidance, it was not 
discussed in all of the face-to-face interviews, suggesting it 
was not an issue of great concern.
Interviewees told us that a revision of the 2014 guid-
ance17 was necessary, as there was still some confusion 
regarding procedures for conflicts of interest:
But it’s still sometimes not everybody gets where there’s 
a conflict of interest and what you should be doing in 
terms of declaring that conflict, managing that conflict, 
even down to business support to that committee, 
knowing when they have to make it absolutely clear in 
the minutes that that person has (withdrawn from the 
meeting) that person has come back into the meeting 
for the very reason of conflict… (Lay member ID 15)
One respondent from the second telephone survey 
felt that the revised 2016 guidance was tighter than the 
original 2014 guidance. Similarly, a case study inter-
viewee voiced the opinion that the revised guidance was 
an improvement on the original, which had been inter-
preted inconsistently by CCGs.
Well, before what we did was we only looked at people 
involved in commissioning from member practices, 
so we went to networks. We didn’t have a register of 
all GP partners. The new guidance is every single 
member of staff, whether they’re a GP or whether 
they’re a cleaner, they will be declaring their address 
and they’ll be published, so we’re waiting for that. 
(Manager ID 13)
While the revised guidance clarified some issues, there 
remained some confusion over terminology, including 
what constituted a ‘close’ relative or friend. During the 
second telephone survey, one respondent interpreted the 
guidance as suggesting that GPs do not need to leave the 
room for minor decisions, but the chair of their PCCC 
had decided that GPs should not participate in the discus-
sion or decision, even if the conflict was minor. This 
suggests that even the revised guidance lacked clarity and 
was open to different interpretations.
One interviewee (lay member ID 15) described the 
revised guidance as a ‘kneejerk reaction’, which was 
too encompassing and even unreasonable, and implied 
there would be a push back by CCGs, particularly as it was 
becoming too onerous to update the register of interests 
and register of gifts and hospitality.
There was also a concern that such an all-embracing 
policy would create suspicion when people did not 
declare an interest, particularly due to the ‘incestuous’ 
(lay member ID 15) nature of the medical profession:
But when somebody comes back on no declarations 
of interests you think you must have some outside 
declarations of interests somewhere, you must have 
something to do with somebody. (Lay member ID 15)
During the second telephone survey, two CCGs spoke 
about assurance more broadly. One respondent said that 
they highlighted any conflicts of interest in the quarterly 
assurance to NHSE. Another respondent spoke of the 
need to demonstrate the adoption of a similar assurance 
process for GP practices as for other providers.
In summary, the main assurance mechanism high-
lighted by our data was the NHSE statutory guidance 
on managing conflicts of interest. Our findings suggest 
that while the revised conflicts of interest guidance was 
an improvement on the original, there was scope for 
further progress in clarifying terminology and proce-
dures outlined therein.
risks of conflicts of interest
The risk of conflicts of interest arises from the public 
stewardship role that GPs assume in their position of 
commissioners of primary care. This differs fundamen-
tally from their role as private providers contracted by the 
NHS to deliver primary care services. Our respondents 
told us that they perceived the risk of conflicts of interest 
concerned processes such as: obtaining clinical input for 
contract and service specifications; supporting the devel-
opment of GP provider organisations; GPs’ influence over 
discussions and decision-making; and GPs’ perceived bias 
towards primary care.
You see, as independent providers there is no 
obligation on them [GPs] to be publically accountable 
in the same way as we are as a CCG. However, if 
they’re using public money there is an obligation on 
them to explain how are we best going to use it. So 
there is this dichotomy here in the NHS between a 
public service being run by independent contractors, 
which has always been, I think, in a sense, a difficulty 
for the NHS ever since it was formed in 1948. (Lay 
member ID 14)
Thus, a central issue was the public interest and 
ensuring value for money for public funds. It was 
regarded as necessary for GPs, as the custodians of public 
funds, to persuade the public that the CCG had no vested 
interests. In both the first telephone survey and the face-
to-face interviews, the perception of a conflict of interest 
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was viewed as being just as serious as an actual conflict 
of interest:
I think it’s something that we are very conscious of, 
not just that it doesn’t happen but that it is perceived 
not to happen either because I think if we ever step 
away from that, it could make the whole thing fail, 
you know what I mean? If people perceive that there 
is unacceptable goings on, then we failed even if there 
is or there isn't. So I think it’s really important that we 
are very, very robust in our discussions, recognising 
that that conflict of interest is there and managing. 
(LMC representative GP ID 30)
Part of the rationale for transferring responsibility for 
commissioning primary care to CCGs was to use their 
knowledge of local population needs. This meant that 
GPs’ conflicts were an inevitable consequence of engaging 
them in decision making about healthcare provision:
So…and the whole point is that you should be 
conflicted because if you’re conflicted it means you 
know about your subject. (CCG chair GP ID 8)
Interviewees viewed conflicts of interest as something 
to be managed rather than eliminated, a view echoed 
in our first telephone survey. CCGs had to weigh using 
the important input of GPs in terms of knowledge of 
local health issues against potential conflicts stemming 
from GPs as members of the organisation holding their 
contracts.
It’s a balancing act as well, between what enables 
the CCG to function as a member led organisation, 
a clinical led organisation and how we make sure 
that we are managing it so that central providers are 
not given an advantage in a competitive world really. 
It’s a balancing act and as I say there’s not one size 
fits all, I think it’s always going to be difficult for us 
and primary care commissioning has made it more 
difficult. (Manager ID 43)
During the second telephone survey, the majority of 
CCGs responded that they had had to deal with conflicts 
of interest. Risks of conflicts of interest identified during 
both telephone surveys arose from the relationships with 
member practices and the performance management 
of practices. Additional risks stemmed from the design, 
review and specification of contracts and services.
One interviewee (manager ID 45) described how 
almost all discussions about primary care by the CCG had 
a financial and workload impact on practices and yet it 
was felt that GPs had to be involved in those discussions. 
A clear example of this was how to obtain clinical input 
to a new outcome-based incentive scheme as described 
during a face-to-face interview:
I know that the [name of a primary care initiative], 
there was a huge conflict of interest around that 
obviously, because we couldn’t necessarily let GPs write 
their own contract, but we also needed their input 
into it. So, we did some workshops and we developed 
something, and then it went to directors, and they 
looked at it, and then it went to Co-commissioning 
Committee to be signed off. (Manager ID 25)
CCGs also had to avoid giving their GP members a 
competitive advantage. A particular challenge was faced 
by the case study sites with GP federations (groups of 
practices that form a consortium to work together as 
providers). In site 2, some federations required help and 
support in the early stages of their establishment and 
the CCG had to be careful about drawing a clear line in 
terms of their input, as the federation was also a potential 
provider.
So the plan is to try and meet with the federation to 
say, okay, well, what support would you like to then be 
able to look at that against potential conflict of interest 
to see where the middle ground is that can actually 
support them with that. Because I think without that 
support, again, it's going to be very difficult for them 
to deliver all the requirements that are needed for 
them. Yeah, but then would you do something like 
write a bid or a tender for an organisation when you 
are a commissioning…for a provider when you are 
a commissioning organisation? That’s where it…
because that’s what they want, that’s what they need, 
because they haven’t got that experience. (Manager 
ID 24)
For some GPs and CCG employees, it was not imme-
diately evident why conflicts of interest should be an 
issue for concern. Conflicts of interest were seen as a 
long-standing and inevitable consequence of GP involve-
ment in commissioning, which could be managed by a 
combination of transparency and careful management of 
committee membership:
I mean, you know, even before we took on co-
commissioning we did commission some services from 
primary care which are called locally commissioned 
services. And we have, you know, in developing those 
services; we have clinical leads who are also providers. 
So, it is something that you are always aware of. But, 
you put, kind of, controls into place. So, when we 
were developing some of those locally commissioned 
services our clinical leads take, you know, help to 
develop the clinical side of it, but, we don’t discuss 
finance until it goes to the procurement committee 
or something like that. So, it’s, you know, I suppose 
you just have to deal with it as well as you can…but 
I don’t see it as a huge problem, conflict of interest. 
(Manager ID 35)
This resonated with a view that ‘GPs are ultimately trust-
worthy people and, therefore, you know, can rise above conflicts 
and make decisions’ (CCG chair GP ID 38). Similarly, a 
respondent from our first telephone survey claimed that 
conflicts of interest were not a risk because there was offi-
cial guidance17 for this.
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During a conflicts of interest training session in site 4, 
one GP attendee pointed out that with his practice part-
ners, he had to make decisions that would affect practice 
income. It was not clear to him how making decisions 
with the CCG that affected income differed from prac-
tice decision making. This suggests that this GP did not 
understand his stewardship role.
During our fieldwork, we became aware of potential 
conflicts of interest issues arising from GPs’ influence 
over discussions and decision making as well as GPs’ bias 
towards primary care. An interviewee who is a lay member 
of the PCCC in site 2 admitted that GP representatives 
have an influence on the lay and non-executive member-
ship in decision making:
We may be non-executives taking decisions but we’re 
here in the presence of two other constituencies. One 
is patient representatives and so on. The other is the 
clinical input from GPs and GPs’ organisations, like 
the LMC. They have an influence on us. They may 
not have executive power, but they have an influence. 
(Lay member ID 14)
On one hand, it is perhaps not surprising that GPs have 
an influence, as their role is to provide clinical input and 
knowledge of local population needs. On the other hand, 
this influence can constitute a conflict of interest if GPs 
manipulate decision making to serve their own interests, 
rather than those of the populations they serve.
An executive member of the PCCC in site 3, when 
discussing decision making about primary care funding, 
recognised the need for awareness of the influence GPs 
and indeed practice managers have on other committee 
members:
and obviously you have to be aware that there’s a 
conflict there, because the Primary Care Committee, 
albeit that the clinical representation is outweighed 
by the main membership, but you know, that if the 
conversation is being influenced by GPs [and practice 
managers], they’ve got a conflict of interest there, 
because they’ve got two hats on. (Manager ID 34)
Another interviewee in the same site went further in 
recognising the difficulty of dealing with this less obvious 
form of conflict of interest:
I don't think that overt conflicts of interest are a 
problem I think that they’re well recognised and 
managed in meetings. I think it’s much more difficult 
the relationships between practices and how that can 
influence and the relationships between clinicians 
and practice managers. I think it’s a challenge to then 
to be able to park all of that and I would recognise 
how difficult that could be. And I don't know how 
if I’m honest, I’m not sure how easy that would be, 
that is going to be going forward. I think there’s a 
potential there for some influence on decisions that 
isn’t overt but that does happen and I think we have 
to be very careful about that. (Manager ID 37)
Interestingly, this ‘soft power’ was less apparent in site 1, 
which employed an independent GP, implying that GPs’ 
pre-existing relationships with other committee members 
may be an important conduit of influence as evidenced 
by the views of (manager ID 37) outlined above.
There was also concern about conflicts of interest 
arising from GPs’ natural predisposition towards primary 
care:
So if they [GPs] had a choice about do I spend this 
money on primary care or secondary care or give it 
to public health or something? They’re going to say 
primary care. So even if it’s not an obvious conflict of 
interest, it’s a not obvious conflict, you know, it’s just…
so how do we get around that? What do our hospital 
colleagues think around our conflict of interests, 
you know, if we go now in our contract and say we’re 
taking £5,000,000 out of the hospital, because we’re 
going to spend it on more GPs and we’re going to 
have less secondary care commissions….I think they 
would then worry about the conflict of interests…
if push came to shove, to make it quick and make a 
decision about do we [do] this in primary care or do 
we do this in secondary care? And I think hospitals 
then would [cry foul] about the conflict of interests 
on that. (Manager ID 42)
We observed evidence of this desire for GPs to prior-
itise investment in primary care during the observation 
of a GB meeting in site 4. The context of the discussion 
was the financial position of the CCG and the risk of a 
deficit in the overall budget, despite the requirement for 
the CCG to break even. GP members voiced resistance to 
using the underspend of the primary care budget to prop 
up secondary care and achieve overall financial balance.
The use of robust evidence-based information in deci-
sion making can help to avoid bias on the part of clinical 
and non-clinical committee members as described by an 
interviewee in site 3:
there have been instances where for example there 
was the LMC representative has contributed in ways 
which I would have ruled inappropriate…… I think 
we have to be very careful about that. And actually 
the instances I’m thinking of that are of concern 
not simply to the public but to the decision-making 
process I would say in terms of equality and parity 
across the GP membership in this CCG. So I think 
it’s about getting robust evidence-based information 
to the committee and making decisions on that basis, 
rather than off-the-hoof comments or suggestions 
about particular practices and whether they may 
or may not be viable in five years, for example. 
(Healthwatch representative ID 29)
Conflicts of interest also posed a problem for committee 
members other than GPs and practice managers, 
including lay members. During our meeting observations 
in sites 1 and 2, there were instances where the lay chair 
of the primary care committee was conflicted and had to 
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Table 3 Management of conflicts of interest
Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Site 4
Number of GPs or 
practice managers that 
are voting members of 
PCCC
One independent GP One local GP (clinical 
lead for primary care 
development)
Two GP members of 
GB and one practice 
manager member 
of GB
Two GB practice 
representatives
Quorum membership At least three members 
including a lay member 
and either chief officer 
or chief finance officer 
or chief of service 
delivery and quality
At least three non-
executive members, 
one GP, two CCG 
chief officers, chief 
finance officer, head of 
contracting and any two 
non-voting members.
1 lay member, 1 GP, 
1 executive member
Four members, which 
must include: chief 
officer or chief finance 
officer and two of the 
following: lay member 
(audit or patient and public 
involvement), lay person, 
nurse or secondary care 
consultant. This must 
include the chair or vice-
chair.
Hold meetings of the 
PCCC in public and 
publish the minutes of 
these minutes on their 
websites
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Independent clinical 
input
Independent GP from 
another area
Secondary care doctor/
registered nurse
Secondary care doctor/
registered nurse
GP members 
from different 
geographical areas
Secondary care 
doctor/registered 
nurse
Independent GP from 
another area
GP members from 
different geographical 
areas
Secondary care doctor/
registered nurse
Published register of 
interests on website
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Published a register of 
gifts and hospitality on 
their websites
Yes Yes Yes (blank, 
presumably because 
staff had not 
received any gifts or 
hospitality to declare)
No
CCG, clinical commissioning group; GB, governing body; GP, general practitioner; PCCC, primary care commissioning committee.
hand over the chair to another lay member. In site 1, the 
conflict arose as the chair (who was substituting for the 
usual chair who was on leave) was a patient at a practice 
under discussion for the relevant item. Although the new 
chair suggested the former chair could have participated 
in the discussion but not record a vote, the latter declined 
following a discussion with the patient representative 
group of the relevant practice.
In general, the risks of conflicts of interest were 
recognised and seen as inevitable and something to be 
managed rather than avoided altogether. The risks of 
conflicts of interest arose mainly from the tension arising 
from GPs’ roles as both commissioners and providers 
of services. Nevertheless, lay members also faced risks 
of conflicts of interest, primarily arising from being 
consumers (ie, patients) of primary care services.
management of conflicts of interest
Given the awareness of the risks of conflicts of interest, 
we investigated how CCGs managed conflicts of interest 
in practice and the extent to which procedures and prac-
tices varied both within and between CCGs.
We found that our case study CCGs had implemented the 
2014 NHSE guidance on managing conflicts of interest17 
that was in place when we commenced our fieldwork. In 
order to address conflicts of interest, CCGs revised their 
governance arrangements and structures. Our case study 
CCGs each established a separate committee for primary 
care commissioning—the PCCC. This committee is a 
decision-making committee and is autonomous from the 
GB. Although there is some overlap in the membership 
of the GB and PCCC, an important difference is that a lay 
member chairs the PCCC. Table 3 outlines the common 
arrangements to manage conflicts of interest that are in 
place in our case study sites.
Data from both telephone surveys indicated that the 
most commonly cited way to manage conflicts was by 
declaring any conflict at the beginning of the meeting. In 
the first telephone survey, one respondent had decided to 
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declare interests at the beginning of the meeting and for 
each individual item in the meeting. A different respon-
dent claimed that they had no concerns with conflicts 
of interest as they declared everything and had been as 
transparent as they could. They thought that the issue of 
conflicts of interest had been exaggerated. We observed 
that all of our case study sites had processes in place for 
members to declare any conflicts of interest at the outset 
of the meeting.
Data from both telephone surveys and the case studies 
revealed that CCGs pursued different approaches to 
addressing conflicts of interest following declarations. It 
was evident that there was a lack of clarity regarding what 
actions to take to manage conflicts of interest, and there 
was much variation in practice at the local level.
During the first telephone survey, some respondents 
told us that they had decided not to allow GPs to vote on 
issues where they were conflicted, while others decided 
not to allow committee members (including GPs) who 
had possible conflicts to participate in meetings at all. One 
respondent argued that they believed it was important to 
have GPs in the room and they tried to reduce conflicts 
of interest by having GPs with a different contractual 
arrangement sitting in that meeting. Another respon-
dent described managing conflicts in other committees 
by putting decisions to the PCCC if the other committee 
could not reach a decision due to conflicts of interest.
In our case study sites, we observed a lack of consistency 
in the approach taken both within and between sites. In 
some instances, the conflicted individuals left the room 
for the entirety of the discussion and vote for the rele-
vant item. In others, the individuals either remained in 
the room to contribute to the discussion but not vote, or 
remained in the room but did not participate in the discus-
sion or vote for the relevant item. Some sites deemed it 
acceptable for the conflicted individual(s) to stay in the 
room despite exclusion from the discussion and/or vote 
when the meeting was in public. The appropriate action 
taken following a declaration did not appear to be consis-
tent but rather depended on the particular item under 
discussion. This finding also emerged from the second 
telephone survey, with one respondent describing the 
need to deal with conflicts of interest on a case-by-case 
basis. Inevitably, GPs were sometimes involved in discus-
sions about funding or contracts as illustrated by the 
following quotes from our case study sites:
but if you look at some of the business we’ve done 
in the last few weeks with [name of provider] which 
was the APMS practices I’d said that was being re-
procured, you know; that was a classic example of one 
where we could stay in the room, make the decisions 
and everything because none of us were conflicted 
because it’s not our practice, it’s not our contract, 
it’s nothing. Then, when you move on to the PMS 
schemes, where we’re talking about, you know, giving 
money to the [number of] practices, essentially we go 
out. (CCG chair GP ID 38)
with the conflict of interest policy, they would be out 
of the room if they were directly conflicted, if they 
were discussing, I don't know, for example, an estates 
issue or funding that affected their practice or their 
locality directly. But if it came to a vote around overall 
funding pot for primary care or new initiatives for 
primary care, the GPs are in the minority there. And 
I think that's fine and that's good. (Manager ID 33)
Some flexibility in approach was deemed necessary in 
order to avoid an impasse in the business of the committee 
as evidenced by the following example where all GPs left 
the room prior to a discussion about a contract with no 
committee member remaining to provide clinical input:
we were discussing minor surgery and the minor surgery 
contract to provide minor surgery for our patients. And 
that was quite a big contract, probably worth several 
hundred thousands of pounds, if not more. So it 
was a major contract which had to be approved by 
governing body, however, all of the GPs there, or 
themselves, provide minor surgery for our patients, 
and therefore, we were all directly conflicted. What 
happened was, that in fact at that stage, almost to 
be seen to be cleaner than clean, all the GPs left the 
room. But then of course, we said well firstly that 
seemed very silly, because it was a public meeting 
anyway, so if it was a public meeting then they 
could’ve still stood at the back. The problem was, 
it was then taken over that there were no clinicians 
left in the room, so we were therefore discussing…
are you a clinician yourself? No, ok, so therefore, the 
remaining group are discussing the pros and cons of 
a minor surgery contract without any clinician being 
in the room. So we said well that is actually stupid, 
how can they make the right decision when there 
is no one to ask for advice? So we said what should 
have actually have happened was that we should’ve all 
stayed in the room and said that we can take no part 
in active discussion, however, we are here for advice 
if you need that advice, but we can only respond to 
questions if asked by the independent members. (GP 
ID 17)
Interviewees recognised the important role of the lay 
membership of the PCCC in terms of their independence 
and ability to challenge other members:
We recruited a new lay member particularly to take 
responsibility for primary care co-commissioning so 
that we could separate it out from other business 
within the CCG because of the conflict of interest for 
our GPs. (CCG accountable officer ID 28)
The attendance and active participation of non-clinical 
members including executive and lay members was also 
viewed an important bulwark against potential conflicts 
for clinical members when their input was required:
we were talking about winter access and schemes 
and he was, you know, I’m so conflicted in this 
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conversation and it was a development conversation 
and it was just, like, well, you’re not the only person 
that’s sat in this room, there are other people in it, 
we need a clinical view about how would this work in 
practice, but you’re not the one that will make the 
decision on it and there are other people in this room 
that will help you manage your conflict. (Manager ID 
46)
There was also an understanding that declarations of 
interest were the responsibility of the affected committee 
member, and there was an onus on other committee 
members to bring the conflict to the attention of the 
committee and for committee members to challenge 
each other about the conflict:
people have got that opportunity to challenge, but I don’t…
so if I’m sat in quality safety committee and I’m aware that 
somebody hasn’t declared and I think there’s a conflict, then I 
will call that out in the meeting and we’ll have a conversation 
about how do we handle it? And it’ll be documented and 
that’s what people do, yeah. (Manager ID 46)
While CCG senior management recognised that conflicts 
of interest were an issue, they felt confident that the govern-
ance structures and policies put in place to address and 
manage conflicts of interest were adequate.
So they’re there, without a shadow of a doubt, I think we’re 
strong in terms of the management of conflicts of interest 
in this organisation, I think [name] is very much keeping 
everybody abreast of change around, you know, the policy 
around it, we’re pretty tight in our committees about how we 
manage the conflicts and always have been prior to the fully 
delegated. [Manager ID46] 
we were, you know, we were going into a different world of 
actually having a transactional relationship with the GPs, 
which could sometimes be tricky when they are members. But, 
by setting up the PCCC, we took that conflict of interest out. 
(CCG chair GP ID 27)
Nevertheless, during the second telephone survey, four 
CCGs viewed the management of conflicts of interest nega-
tively, describing the processes in place as ‘cumbersome’, 
‘fairly extreme’ and ‘too robust’. They argued that this led to 
a diminution of the clinical perspective in the CCG, resulting 
in limited development of primary care. During our inter-
views, it emerged that GP members have had to adjust to the 
new governance arrangements and additional scrutiny that 
has arisen because of co-commissioning and this was seen as 
a big change for them. The GP membership were not always 
happy with the new policies.
sometimes the GP membership may feel they want more 
involvement or more say in what happens and I think that’s 
where there can be some disharmony or disunity or sometimes 
frustration or unhappiness that why was this commissioned? 
Why hasn’t my practice had that offer of being able to do 
this service or that service? Because sometimes possibly they 
feel if we are a GP member organisation why can’t we as 
a member just decide everything? I think there has to be a 
middle ground. (GP ID 16)
One respondent from the second telephone survey 
reflected that while it was relatively easy to set up commit-
tees that adhered to the guidance, it was difficult for these 
committees to make decisions in isolation from the GB. Our 
interview data revealed that GPs on the GB felt divorced 
from the PCCC and this caused frustration as primary care 
was their area of expertise and the separation could inhibit 
a strategic overview of the CCG. There was also resentment 
that GPs did not create the issue of conflicts of interest yet 
they were seemingly to blame for it.
The cynic in me will say well the government created…
we didn’t create this ourselves, the government created this 
system, they brought it up and then said that you need 
to manage the conflicts of interest. But they created the 
conflicts of interest in the first place. I mean, they created a 
body because they specifically wanted to do so, which has a 
majority of GPs voting on it. They said that they wanted to 
hand down Primary Care Commissioning, and then said 
well now you’ve got all these conflicts of interest, and look at 
all the rotten things that you are doing. So well, they created 
the body in the first place. (GP ID 17)
However, it was felt that the procedures were necessary, 
even if they were not popular among everybody:
But we have the conflicts of interest stuff and we need to 
look independently of these things and we’ve made the right 
decisions and some of them might be tough decisions and you 
can’t always give people what they always want. (Manager 
ID 42)
To summarise, CCGs revised their governance arrange-
ments and procedures in order to manage the greater risk 
of conflicts of interest arising from primary care co-com-
missioning. Declarations of interest during meetings 
were common, but there generally lacked a consensus 
about the appropriate approach to take following decla-
rations. Both managers and GPs expressed negative views 
concerning the management of conflicts of interest.
DiscussiOn AnD cOnclusiOns
In response to the heightened risk of conflicts of interest 
from CCGs commissioning primary care, NHSE published 
guidance for CCGs on managing conflicts of interest prior 
to the delegation of responsibilities and subsequently 
strengthened this guidance. The 2016 revised guidance 
stressed transparency in terms of declarations and regis-
ters of interest, lay membership of the PCCC, conflicted 
members leaving the room for discussions and/or deci-
sions, public involvement in PCCC meetings and robust 
record-keeping.
While the 2016 revised guidance18 improved on the 
original 2014 guidance17 by developing certain areas 
such as governance and registers of interest, there was 
still a lack of precision about the use of terms such as 
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‘appropriate’ and ‘robust’. The 2016 revised guidance 
did not clarify what constitutes a ‘close friend’, a term that 
continues to cause confusion among users of the revised 
guidance. There was also some ambiguity in respect of 
when a conflicted individual should leave the room for 
discussions and/or decision making.
CCGs have established governance structures to manage 
conflicts of interest in line with the statutory guidance. 
Separate committees with decision-making authority for 
primary care have been established, and these committees 
have a majority of executive and lay members with GPs in a 
minority. However, there is a sense of confusion regarding 
the national rules for managing conflicts of interest, and 
there is wide variation in local practice and structures. 
CCGs do not follow a consistent approach following a 
declaration of a conflict of interest by a GP or practice 
manager, and in some cases conflicted individuals partic-
ipated in discussions about contracts and funding, which 
are areas most susceptible to conflicts of interest. Further-
more, there is an increasing awareness of and concern 
about the potential for less overt conflicts that are more 
difficult to identify and address. In particular, GPs and 
practice managers appear able to affect decision making 
by exerting influence on non-clinical committee members, 
notwithstanding governance arrangements limiting their 
formal participation. Moreover, despite the weight given to 
the lay membership of the PCCC, lay members themselves 
are not always immune to conflicts of interest, for example, 
from being a patient at a CCG member practice. We also 
found evidence of a more blasé attitude towards the risk 
of conflicts of interest among some study participants with 
a lack of awareness of the need for public accountability.
This is the first research to be undertaken exploring the 
risk of conflicts of interest after CCGs took on responsi-
bility for primary care co-commissioning. We complement 
four in-depth case studies of CCGs with two representative 
telephone surveys. Nevertheless, our study was conducted 
during the early stages of CCGs commissioning primary 
care. Given the relatively swift implementation process, 
it can be expected that CCGs were still finding their feet 
and learning by doing.
This study builds on the NAO Report,2 as our data 
collection took place after CCGs took on primary care 
co-commissioning, thereby allowing us to investigate how 
CCGs were managing the increased risk of conflicts of 
interest, as well as investigating their plans or policies. 
Our case study approach allowed us to collect richer data 
as meeting observations enabled us to see how conflicts 
of interest policies and procedures were implemented in 
practice. Our findings substantiate the concerns raised by 
the NAO of the increased risk of conflicts of interest stem-
ming from the introduction of primary care co-commis-
sioning and the difficulty CCGs faced when attempting to 
respond effectively to these risks.
Our findings from both the case studies and first tele-
phone surveys that suggest that CCGs’ concerns about 
conflicts of interest centred on the perception as well as an 
actual conflict concur with those of Holder et al.23
Conflicts of interest have been recognised as an 
important issue since the inception of CCGs and gained 
renewed attention with the delegation of responsibility 
for commissioning of primary care. This presents a risk 
that groups of GPs will commission themselves or their 
practices to provide services. Therefore, the conflict of 
interest arising from CCGs commissioning primary care 
is not akin to conflicts of interest faced by GPs in clin-
ical practice such as those arising from interactions with 
the pharmaceutical and medical device industries where 
disclosure is a common although imperfect remedy.24 25 
Rather, GPs commissioning primary care face conflicts of 
interest in the form of self-dealing, similar to those faced 
by managers in business. A range of corporate gover-
nance mechanisms has been devised to prevent corpo-
rate managers from engaging in conflicts of interest, 
most notably the use of independent boards to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders. Simply increasing 
transparency by disclosing a potential conflict of interest 
is not viewed as an adequate measure to prevent unde-
sirable behaviour. Moreover, given the limitations of 
corporate governance arrangements, it has been found 
necessary in the corporate world to recognise and avoid 
circumstances that can potentially give rise to conflicts of 
interests. A parallel can also be drawn with the conflicts 
of interests faced by clinicians in the development of clin-
ical guidelines. A recent study26 explored how conflicts 
of interest are disclosed and managed by a national clin-
ical guideline developer, the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence in England. Similar to PCCCs, 
members of guideline development groups (GDGs) were 
provided with guidance on what constituted a conflict of 
interest and declarations were made at the outset of meet-
ings. Nevertheless, the study found that some conflicts of 
interest, in particular, non-financial interests were diffi-
cult to identify, and clinicians were often unaware that 
their activities constituted a conflict. This posed difficul-
ties given that self-reporting was integral to the conflicts 
of interest policy. The authors concluded that the mere 
existence of an explicit policy or guidance is insufficient 
to address conflicts of interest and recommended that 
GDG chairs and members receive appropriate training in 
order to manage conflicts of interest.
Giving CCGs the responsibility to commission primary 
care created a structural conflict of interest, which cannot be 
adequately addressed with governance structures and regu-
lations that stress transparency. Simply disclosing an interest 
does not prevent GPs and practice managers from influ-
encing discussions about primary care, which may under-
mine their public stewardship role. Moreover, the emphasis 
on lay membership of the committee may not fully resolve 
the issues in respect of conflicts of interest, as there are 
sometimes cases where lay members also face conflicts of 
interest. Similarly, the management of conflicts of interest 
using self-policing by means of committee members iden-
tifying the potential conflicts of interests of other members 
can be limited by the personal or pre-existing relationships 
between committee members.
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The revised statutory guidance18 suggests that CCGs 
should consider appointing retired or out-of-area GPs to 
the PCCC to minimise conflicts of interest and gain access 
to clinical advice. Our study shows that the appoint-
ment of an independent GP could alleviate the soft power 
that GP members could have in influencing decision 
making. Therefore, NHSE should consider mandating 
the appointment of an out-of-area GP to PCCCs. The 
guidance on managing conflicts of interest published by 
NHSE needs to be more precise and less ambiguous so 
that there is more consistency both within and between 
CCGs in interpreting this guidance. An additional 
strategy would be to provide training and support for lay 
and non-executive members without clinical experience 
to enable them to make decisions requiring clinical input 
without relying too heavily on GPs or being influenced by 
GPs. CCGs could also consider appointing lay members 
with relevant professional experience to the conflicts 
of interest guardian role. For example, a CCG that was 
subject to a conflict of interest investigation in 2016 
recently appointed a barrister specialising in professional 
conduct as its conflicts of interest guardian.27
It would be useful to conduct follow-up research exam-
ining how CCGs are managing conflicts of interest once 
primary care co-commissioning is fully embedded in CCGs.
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